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DEFENDANT GOOGLE, INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT (filed 08/10/12)

Court hears oral argument. The Tentative circulated and attached hereto, is adopted as the Court's final
ruling. The Court GRANTS IN PART / DENIES IN PART defendant Google, Inc.'s motion to
dismiss the first amended complaint, with two weeks leave to amend the claims as stated on the record.
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Home Decor Center, Inc. v. Google, Inc.. et al•. Case No. CV-12-5706
Tentative Ruling on Motion to Dismiss

I. Background
Plaintiff Home Decor Center ("Plaintiff') filed suit in state court against Google, Inc.
("Google") and Home Depot, Inc. ("Home Depot") (collectively "Defendants"). See generally
Compl., Docket No. 1, Exh. A. Defendant timely removed. !d. Plaintiff filed a First Amended
Complaint ("FAC") on July 25, 2012 (Docket No. 16), and now pleads nine causes of action: (1)
federal trademark infringement and unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (2) unfair
competition under the Lanham Act; (3) unfair business practices under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
§§ 17200 ("UCL"), et seq.; (4) trademark infringement under the Lanham Act; (5) contributory
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act; (6) vicarious trademark infringement under the
Lanham Act; (7) injunctive relief; (8) interference with prospective contractual relations; and (9)
"passing off" under the Lanham Act. See generally FAC.
Customers can find Plaintiffs website, www.HomeDecorCenter.com, through Google's
search engine. FAC ~ 11. Plaintiff also utilized Google's "AdWords" service, through which
Plaintiff paid Google a sum of money "for its ... website to be more accessible to consumers[.]"
FAC ~ 12. 1 In September 2011, Plaintiff allegedly received a high volume of customer
complaints, and Plaintiffs sales allegedly decreased by sixty percent. FAC ~ 13. Plaintiff
searched for its own domain name (i.e., www.homedecorcenter.com, in contrast to its own name,
simply Home Decor Center) on Google's search engine, and discovered an advertisement for
www.HomeDecorators.com, a site owned by Defendant Home Depot, which claimed to link to
"The Official Website for HomeDecorCenter.com," Plaintiffs site. The ad then displayed the
URL www.homedecorators.com, which is not Plaintiffs website, but which is allegedly owned
by Defendant Home Depot. FAC ~~ 15-17. In other words, an ad Defendant Home Depot placed
on Google, for Defendant Home Depot's business, purports in some respects to be an ad for
Plaintiff's business, but then links to Defendant's business. 2
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of this erroneously linked advertisement, consumers
seeking to access Plaintiffs website were directed to Defendant Home Depot's website, and
when they received substandard service, accordingly believed that such service had been
provided by Plaintiff. FAC ~~ 19-20. Plaintiff claims it has been forced to make price
1

Neither party provides a clear or detailed description of the nature of the AdWords program. The Court
would request further elucidation as to that point at the hearing. However a description of the program is found in
Rescuecom v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2009): "AdWords is Google's program through which
advertisers purchase terms (or keywords). When entered as a search term, the keyword triggers the appearance of the
advertiser's ad and link. An advertiser's purchase of a particular term causes the advertiser's ad and link to be
displayed on the user's screen whenever a searcher launches a Google search based on the purchased search term.
Advertisers pay Google based on the number of times Internet users 'click' on the advertisement, so as to link to the
advertiser's website."
2

Plaintiff does not appear to allege that Google, in posting one of Plaintiff's own ads, incorrectly linked it
to Defendant's site. However, the Court would confirm this point with the parties at the hearing.
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adjustments and grant refunds to customers who were misdirected to Home Depot's website via
the Google advertisement. FAC ~ 21. In early 2012, Plaintiff mailed a cease and desist letter to
both Defendants, putting them on notice that Plaintiff is the owner of the registered trademark
"HOME DECOR CENTER" (USPTO Serial No. 85524323). FAC ~~ 25-27, Exh. C. Plaintiff
also alleges it owns the registered domain name www.homedecorcenter.com. FAC ~ 9.
Before the Court is Defendant Google's motion to dismiss the FAC. Docket No. 19.
Defendant Home Depot has joined in the motion. Docket No. 20.

II. Legal Standard
Plaintiffs in federal court are required to give only "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under Rule
12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted for one of two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or
(2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007). See also Mendiondo v. Centinela Hasp. Med Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir.
2008) ("Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a
cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory."). A motion to
dismiss should be granted if the complaint does not proffer enough facts to state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558-59; see also William 0. Gilley
Enters., Inc. v. At!. Richfield Co., 588 F.3d 659, 667 (9th Cir. 2009) (confirming that Twombly
pleading requirements "apply in all civil cases"). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit
the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it
has not 'show[n]' -'that the pleader is entitled torelief. "' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679
(2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, the court is limited to the allegations on the face ofthe
complaint (including documents attached thereto), matters which are properly judicially
noticeable and other extrinsic documents when "the plaintiffs claim depends on the contents of a
document, the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss, and the parties do not
dispute the authenticity of the document, even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the
contents ofthat document in the complaint." Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir.
2005). The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
must accept all factual allegations as true. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 33738 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court must also accept as true all reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the material allegations in the complaint. See Barker v. Riverside Cnty. Office of
Ed, 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009); Pareto v. F.D.lC., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).
Conclusory statements, unlike proper factual allegations, are not entitled to a presumption of
truth. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681; Moss v. US. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

III. Analysis
A. Communications Decency Act
Google argues that the state law claims (namely the UCL, injunctive relief and
interference of contractual relations causes of action) all fail as a matter of law because of the
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broad grant of immunity provided to internet services such as itself by Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act ("Section 230"), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1V Section 230 provides:
"No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." 47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(1). The Ninth Circuit has explained the purpose of Section 230 as applied to an
"information content provider" such as Google as follows:
The specific provision at issue here, § 230(c)(1 ), overrides the traditional
treatment of publishers, distributors, and speakers under statutory and common
law ... Congress wanted to encourage the unfettered and unregulated
development of free speech on the Internet, and to promote the development of
e-commerce ... Making interactive computer services and their users liable for
the speech of third parties would severely restrict the information available on the
Internet.

Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying Section 230 to bar internet
services provider's liability for defamation). See also Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339
F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) ("the Batzel decision joined the consensus developing across
other courts of appeals that § 230(c) provides broad immunity for publishing content provided
primarily by third parties"). Accordingly, courts have granted motions to dismiss claims against
Google which attempt to impose liability for claims arising out of third parties' use of the
AdWords program. See, e.g., Jurin v. Google, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122-1123 (E.D. Cal.
2010) ("[Google's] AdWords program simply allows competitors to post their digital fliers ...
[Google] is therefore immunized from liability [under Section 230]"); Goddard v. Google, Inc.,
640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1198-1199 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that Google merited Section 230
immunity because "Google's AdWords program was [not] anything other than 'a framework that
could be utilized for proper or improper purposes"') (internal citations omitted); Gentry v. eBay,
Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816, 830 (2002) (affirming trial court's sustaining a demurrer to plaintiffs
claims against defendant eBay because "Section 230(c)(1) [interactive service providers] and
their users from causes of action asserted by persons alleging harm caused by content provided
by a third party") (emphasis added). Here, exactly as in Jurin and Goddard, Plaintiffs claims
arise out of an ad created by Home Depot via the Ad Words program. There can be little question
that Section 230 thus applies to bar Plaintiffs state law claims as against Google (only).
Plaintiff attempts to get around this seemingly insurmountable bar by asserting in its
opposition papers that Google and Home Depot "jointly created" the ad, as opposed to merely
authorizing or posting the ad the Home Depot created. Specifically, Plaintiff in briefing asserts
that Google "decided to improperly title" the offending ad. Docket No. 22 at 6. However, the
FAC itself contains no such allegations, or any claim that Google "created" the ad, and as such
the Court may not assess whether those allegations could withstand dismissal in the face of

3

While it does not expressly state as much, presumably Google does not evoke Section 230 to defeat
Plaintiffs trademark claims because the statute expressly provides: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to
limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property." 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).
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Section 230. See Cordell v. Tilton, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1128 (S.D. Cal. 2007) ("The focus of
any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal ... is the complaint. This precludes the consideration of new
allegations that may be raised in plaintiffs opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6)") (internal citations omitted). Instead, the FAC alleges merely that Google
"individually authorized" the ads and that the ads generate profit for Google. FAC ~ 22. But the
caselaw clearly indicates that neither Google's alleged individual authorization of each ad
through the AdWords program, nor allegations that Google profited from the Home Depot's ad,
permit Plaintiffs claims against Google to escape Section 230's broad grant of immunity. See
Goddard, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1198 ("Plaintiffs allegations [that Google authorized the posting of
the ads], if true, would not establish that Google did anything to encourage the posting of false or
misleading AdWords"); Gentry, 99 Cal. App. 4th at 822 (upholding Section 230 immunity even
though defendant eBay garnered "millions of dollars in profits" from the third party content
giving rise to the claims).
The Court would permit Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the Complaint so as to allege
what now appears to be its theory of the case: that Google not only served as the blank slate for
Home Depot's ad, but also played some role in the creation of the content of the ad. 4 See
Goddard, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1195-96 (dismissing Plaintiffs claims with prejudice on second
motion to dismiss after, in granting first motion to dismiss, "Plaintiff was granted leave to
amend, with express instructions that she attempt to 'establish Google's involvement in 'creating
or developing' the AdWords, either 'in whole or in part,' so as to avoid CDA
immunity")(internal citations and quotations omitted).
The Court would discuss the matter of amendment at the hearing, but would likely
GRANT WITHOUT PREJUDICE Defendant Google's motion to dismiss the UCL, injunctive
relief and interference of contractual relations causes of action as to Defendant Google only, due
to the operation of Section 230. 5
B. Trademark Infringement Allegations
Any claim for trademark infringement must obviously include an allegation that the
Defendant used that trademark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Google argues that Plaintiffs
trademark claims fail at this most basic level, at least as against Google, because Plaintiffs mark
(all parties assuming only for purposes of the instant motion that it is valid) is for the phrase
"HOME DECOR CENTER" whereas Google's alleged use of it is only the use of"a portion of
the URL for Plaintiffs website, www.homedecorcenter.com." Docket No 19 at 10; FAC ~ 16.
In other words, Plaintiff has not alleged that if one searches for the keyword "Home Decor
Center," then the offending ad comes up, but only if one searches for the keyword "www.home
decorcenter.com." Google has cited no cases to support the notion that just because the mark
forms part of a larger phrase (or URL), that there has been no "use" of the trademark. Google
4

0f course, Plaintiff may only plead allegations if doing so is consistent with the rules of professional
conduct and Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
5

Given the finding that Google is shielded from liability as to the state law claims due to Section 230, the
Court need not address its alternative arguments as to why the state law claims fail as a matter of law as against
Google. See Docket No. 19 at 12-13.
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notes that similar cases involving trademark claims based on the AdWords program generally
allege that the keyword was the actual trademark, not a domain name including the mark, citing
as an example Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 124 (2d Cir. 2009). Yet that is not
dispositive of the matter; Go ogle has not provided convincing argument or authority that would
persuade this Court to find that because the purported trademark use occurs within a website
URL, that it does not constitute "use" for purposes of trademark infringement. Thus the Court
would DENY Google's motion to dismiss the trademark claims (in their various iterations).
C. Injunctive Relief
Defendant Google argues that Plaintiffs cause of action entitled "injunctive relief'
should be dismissed because it is well established that injunctive relief is a remedy, not cause of
action; Google is correct. See Marlin v. AIMCO Venezia, 154 Cal. App. 4th 154, 162 (2007);
McDowell v. Watson, 59 Cal. App. 4th 1155, 1159 (1997) ("Injunctive relief is a remedy and not,
in itself, a cause of action") (quotation and citation omitted). Moreover, Plaintiff effectively
concedes the point, noting that "Injunctive Relief may not necessarily be a cause of action on its
own" yet arguing that it may merit the remedy of injunctive relief as to its other claims. Docket
No. 22 at 11. The Court would GRANT WITH PREJUDICE Defendant's motion to dismiss the
claim for injunctive relief, though the Court's so holding will not effect Plaintiffs ability to seek
injunctive relief as to its other claims as would otherwise be permitted.

D. Lanham Act Claims
Google seeks to dismiss Plaintiffs second, fourth and ninth claims under the Lanham Act
(for infringement, unfair competition and "passing off'), because they are "redundant of
Plaintiffs first claim for federal common law trademark infringement and unfair competition."
Docket No. 19 at 13. Plaintiff fails to respond to this argument by distinguishing the claims.
The Court would discuss this matter with the parties at the hearing; on the one hand, Google has
not cited authority dismissing claims for reason of duplicativeness in this context, but on the
other hand, Plaintiff has made no effort to show how claims two, four and nine are distinct from
his first claim, either on a legal or factual basis. If Plaintiff fails to argue at the hearing that the
claims are in fact distinct, it might serve the interests of all parties to "clean up" the FAC, as it
were, by granting the motion to dismiss to eliminate duplicative claims and requiring Plaintiff to
submit an amended complaint pleading each factually and legally identical claim only once.
E. Effect of this Order Upon Defendant Home Depot
Defendant Home Deport has joined in Google's motion. Docket No. 20. However, the
Court would find that the arguments proferred by Google do not have any bearing on whether the
state law claims this Court has dismissed as against Google should also be dismissed as against
Home Depot, with the exception of the injunctive relief claim that Plaintiff concedes should be
dismissed as against all parties. In other words, neither Defendant has argued that Home Depot
merits Section 230 immunity. Further, the alternative arguments Google raised with respect to
the state law claims, not considered by the Court (see footnote 5, supra) were similarly focused
on the deficiency of the pleading with respect to Google, not Home Depot. See Docket No. 19 at
11-13. Thus, in the absence of any motion to dismiss the FAC filed by Home Depot, at present
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the case will move forward against Home Depot as to all causes of action except the nowdismissed injunctive relief cause of action. The Court would inquire of Defendant Home Depot
at the hearing as to whether it has any thoughts on this aspect ofthe matter.

F. Requests for Judicial Notice
Both parties requested that the Court take judicial notice of documents related to
Plaintiffs filings with the USPTO with regard to the trademark at issue in this case. Docket Nos.
21, 23. Neither party has objected to the other's request for judicial notice, and such documents
are properly the subject of judicial notice. See, e.g., Pollution Denim & Co. v. Pollution Clothing
Co., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1136 n.13 (taking judicial notice of"online records maintained by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office"). While the Court would GRANT both requests, the
Court notes that such documents are related primarily to the validity of Plaintiffs mark, which
Google did not squarely address in this motion. See Docket No. 19 at 11 n.8 ("Should this case
proceed past the pleadings stage, Google intends to challenge the validity of Plaintiffs purported
"Home Decor Center" mark.") (emphasis added). Thus, no portion of this Order relied on the
judicially noticed documents.

IV. Conclusion
The Court would GRANT, likely WITHOUT PREJUDICE though perhaps WITH
PREJUDICE, Defendant Google's motion to dismiss the UCL, interference of contractual
relations causes of action AS AGAINST GOOGLE ONLY. The Court would GRANT WITH
PREJUDICE Defendant Google's motion to dismiss the injunctive relief claim AS AGAINST
ALL DEFENDANTS. The Court would DENY Defendant Google's motion to dismiss the
remaining claims.
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